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Elites in the UK
New approaches to contemporary class divisions
Ana Paula Hey, Anna Grimaldi-Christensen and Mike Savage
Introduction
This paper reflects on the wider implications of Mike Savage’s arguments about the 
relationship between class analysis and the emerging sociology of elites1. We believe 
that in the current social and political context this project is of central importance 
across the globe. Elites are increasingly salient and visible social actors, and are ever 
more the subject of various grievances associated with populist politics. The task of 
sociologically rendering elites, removing them from the orbit of political science, and 
construing their relationship to social class, is of critical importance. This involves 
recognising the specificity of the British context in this work, as a means of prising 
out what might be of relevance in other political contexts. 
We begin by clarifying how Savage identifies the significance of elites in his 
past research on the uk, before discussing the development of “new elites” in the 
context of neoliberal financialisation. The third section reviews the ways in which 
analyses of the elite relates to the arguments of the Great British Class Survey, 
1. Before we begin, we need to explain the authorship of this paper. This arises from wider collaborations 
between the three authors, Ana Paula Hey and Anna Grimaldi-Christensen, who took the initiative in 
formulating the synthesis presented here, and the later assistance of Mike Savage, who takes full joint 
responsibility for the arguments delivered. Nonetheless, in order to ensure clarity of exposition, Savage’s 
previous research is referred to in the third party throughout this text. Thanks also to Georgia Nichols 
for her assistance with editing.
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examining in greater detail the sociological elements of the elites as discussed by 
Savage. Finally, the fourth section assesses the wider implications of this work for 
the study of elites in other political contexts, particularly Brazil where this article 
is being published. 
uk social space: classes and elites
Over the past thirty years, British sociology – like that of many nations – has experi-
enced a separation between research dedicated to social classes and that of the elites 
(see the discussion in Savage e Williams, 2008). Such a shift needs to be challenged 
given the fundamental dynamic of a classed society in a period of new capitalist 
forms, generated by shifts occurring in the late 1970s and particularly in the 1980s. 
This phase is characterized by “the most rapid and dramatic shift of income, assets 
and resources in favour of the very rich that has ever taken place in human history” 
(Savage e Williams, 2008, p. 1). The so-called “super rich” gain visibility in the old 
capitalist countries, such as the uk and the usa, and spread on a global scale, paral-
lel to the consolidation of neoliberalism as a form of economic, political and social 
organization. Besides being new in the field of sociology (see Froud et al., 2006; 
Savage e Williams, 2008; Savage, 2015), bringing the elite into view requires a new 
tone in epistemological and methodological approaches shrouded in the concrete 
class divisions of contemporary capitalism.
Exploring elites in times of neoliberalism also requires de-veiling the mechanisms 
of social composition, distribution and the use of power and privilege, echoing 
Boltanski (2013):
It is true that since the 2000s, there has developed an excellent philosophical and sociological 
critique of neoliberalism. The problem, very concretely, is that it hasn’t been taken on in the 
field of politics, of course on the right, but also on the left. This forces us to wonder what 
the social order in which we are immersed might be, that is to say, a form of domination 
in which criticism can be expressed freely, but without producing the slightest effect. This 
should prompt us, as sociologists, to look not only at the poorest, or the dominated, whose 
condition disgusts us, but also, or above all, the “elites”, the “leaders” who occupy positions 
of power, as well as to the devices that enable them both to implement this power and to 
conceal it. We need, therefore, to better understand new mechanisms of power within a 
national and global framework, and in particular how they are supported less by ideologies 
aimed at formatting the desires of subjects than on the argument of necessity: “Whether 
you want it or not, there is only one way”. This new phenomenon could be seen in Bourdieu 
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in 1976, that is, in his early days, when we published an article on “the production of the 
dominant ideology”2.
Essentially, the argument developed in this section is that we must contest 
the recent distinction we find created between traditional class and stratification 
theory, and a dedicated elite theory. This will require the typical economic analyt-
ics used to define the elite to cross-fertilise with the more sociological approach 
being applied to class analysis in innovative ways. The objective is, therefore, for 
research that can demonstrate a social structure which embodies class divisions but 
which simultaneously considers the properties that characterize society as a whole, 
analytically bringing to light a “distinct” portion with extreme levels of power and 
wealth. Inspired by the construction of social classes framed by Pierre Bourdieu, 
particularly in La distinction (1979), Savage sees classes as composed through three 
types of capital: the economic (wealth and income), the cultural (tastes, interests 
and activities) and the social, (social networks, friendships and associations). This 
approach took shape in a wide collective project associated with the Cultural Capital 
and Social Exclusion Project and developed together with the Centre for Research 
on Socio-Cultural Change3 (see respectively: Savage et al., 2015c; Savage, 2015; 
Silva, 2015). First, the project used nationally representative survey data that could 
demonstrate the various forms of capital and the power that such capitals assume 
in their distribution across social space. Applying multiple correspondence analysis 
(mca) to the data culminated in the work organized by Tony Bennett, “Culture, 
class, distinction”, published in 2009.
This study “affirms that ‘the most powerful dimension of cultural difference… 
reflects what Bourdieu called ‘total volume of capital’, holdings of cultural and eco-
nomic assets, which form the basis of social class structure’ (Bennett et al., 2009, 
2. In the original: “C’est vrai qu’à partir des années 2000, s’est développée une excellente critique philoso-
phique et sociologique du néolibéralisme. Le problème, bien concret, est qu’elle n’a pas eu prise sur le 
champ politique, bien sûr à droite, mais aussi à gauche. Cela nous oblige à nous demander ce que peut 
bien être l’ordre social dans lequel nous sommes plongés, c’est-à-dire une forme de domination dans 
laquelle la critique peut s’exprimer librement, mais pourtant sans produire le moindre effet./Cela devrait 
nous inciter, en tant que sociologues, à nous intéresser non seulement aux plus pauvres ou aux dominés, 
dont la condition nous indigne, mais aussi, ou surtout, aux ‘elites’, aux ‘responsables’, qui occupent les 
positions de pouvoir, et aux dispositifs qui leur permettent à la fois de mettre en œuvre ce pouvoir et de le 
dissimuler. Il nous faut donc mieux comprendre les nouveaux dispositifs de pouvoir, dans un cadre natio-
nal et dans un cadre global et, notamment, la façon dont ils prennent appui, moins sur des idéologies 
visant à formater les désirs des sujets que sur l’argument de la nécessité : ‘Que vous le vouliez ou non, il 
n’y a qu’une seule voie’. Ce phénomène nouveau, nous l’avions entrevu avec Bourdieu dès 1976, c’est-
à-dire à ses débuts, lorsque nous avons publié un article sur ‘la production de l’idéologie dominante’”.
3. Team of key researchers composed of Tony Bennett, Mike Savage, Elizabeth Silva and Alan Warde.
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p. 251). […] These two indicators – occupation and education – correlate strongly 
because the distribution of economic capital (the key asset for class position) forms 
the basis for the distribution of the other forms of capital: cultural and social” (Silva, 
2015, p. 378).
For the Brazilian and wider Latin American public, such research allows an in-
terface with the elaboration of methodological mechanisms, potentially useful from 
the comparative point of view, and which involve familiar theoretical constructs. In 
particular, we refer here to the fertile dialogue with Bourdieu (1966; 1979; 1985) 
on constructing classes inductively, rather than through scholastic and deductive 
schema. Here we depart from the notion that their expression resides, effectively, 
in the: “belonging to a social structure, as a system of positions and oppositions 
endowed with meaning, which confer properties of class, thus differentiating class 
condition (inherent properties) from class position (the specificity of which is as-
sumed given the location in a position different to other classes)” (Hey e Catani, 
2013, p. 33). At the same time, we also refer to an essential aspect relative to how 
cultural classification systems are rooted in the class system, in which elements such 
as schooling, sociocultural practices, preferences and tastes are amalgamated in a 
structurally unequal distribution across agents in the social world.
This view was elaborated in analysis of data produced by the largest survey ever to 
take place in the uk, the Great British Class Survey 2011 (gbcs), directed by Mike 
Savage (lse) and Fiona Devine (University of Manchester)4. Developed through 
collaborations between academics, the bbc Lab uk and bbc Current Affairs5, the 
survey attracted responses from over 161,000 people, encompassing questions on 
assets and income, cultural activities and social ties, which were then used to dis-
cern seven “new” social classes. The survey was complemented with a further 1,026 
respondents, using face to face surveys conducted by the market-research firm gfk 
(see Savage et al., 2015b). Asking identical questions to those in the gbcs, this data 
4. This survey required an extensive and thorough elaboration by Savage and his colleagues within sociol-
ogy, as it questioned the very limits of the definition of class, not only by professional occupation, tra-
ditionally used in national census surveys, but by the conjugation of resources of material and symbolic 
order (see Froud et al., 2006; Savage e Williams, 2008; Savage, 2015).
5. Segments of the publicly funded bbc (British Broadcasting Corporation). bbc Lab uk is a website that 
hosted the survey. The platform to explore social class was proposed by Trippenbach, an interactive 
producer at the bbc (See Devine e Snee, 2015). The web survey required twenty minutes from each 
respondent to answer questions on their leisure interests, cultural tastes, social networks and economic 
situation. Following the success of this stage, an interactive Class Calculator was also created by bbc 
Lab uk, which takes less than a minute to ask about income, savings and house value, cultural interests 
and social networks. In just a few seconds, the calculator reveals the “new” class that the respondent 
belongs to. By the end of 2014, approximately 9 million people had used the Class Calculator (take the 
test at http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22000973).
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was used to benchmark the biases observed in the initial results, and included fifty 
interviews geared to rendering more qualitative evidence concerning what people 
thought about class in their own words. The (big) data generated by gbcs project6 
could be, and has been, interpreted in a number of ways, but what interests us here 
is demonstrating those results which allow a discussion about the top of the social 
structure. It is not our intention to discuss how the seven specific classes developed 
in the Great British Class Survey were elaborated by Savage and his colleagues 
through the linking of forms of capital (economic, cultural and social). This would 
consist of a long and ample discussion in the field of sociology, which has already 
taken place in many journals7. Furthermore, a focus on the seven classes as opposed 
to the rationale behind them, as will be demonstrated in the final section, has seen 
a series of criticisms. Instead, we focus on how a very wealthy elite at the apex of the 
class structure stands out, and how they form a strong and distinctive social class 
in large part due to wealth, but also because they are culturally engaged and well 
connected. In doing so we highlight the centrality of accumulation and therefore 
the discreet categorical distinctions which define the elite, in ways which reshape 
wider class analysis and the relationship between the two.
Elites and “new elites”
In the book Social class in the 21st century, Savage et al. (2015c) focus in particular 
on the very wealthy, who have exclusive social circles and enjoy similar pursuits, 
often attending the same elite universities and collecting in specific urban locations: 
“London and other major cities are becoming key venues for this elite formation” 
(Savage, 2016, p. 478). Appearing nothing like the classic “old boys club”, aristocratic 
land-owning stereotype of the past, the current uk elite have largely disappeared 
from view, both in the public eye as well as in academic research, due largely to 
poorly adapted research tools. 
Conventional classifications no longer serve to locate and describe the “elite” of 
British society to a satisfactory degree. These “hegemonic social science methods” 
allow the elite to slip from view (Savage e Williams, 2008, p. 7). Classic survey and 
interview methods, basing results on financial and economic data analysis, as well as 
occupation and education, theoretically stem from the ideas which only recognize 
6. The data can be accessed via the uk data archive (https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn= 
7616).
7. See, in particular, the special issues dedicated to the presentation of this research and its results, as well 
as to the criticisms raised in: Sociological Review, 63 (2), 2015; Sociology, 47 (2), 2013; 48 (3), 2014; 49 
(6), 2015.
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two forms of interaction or influence between the so-called elite class and wider 
society: either as key (active) agents for social change, or as (passive) instruments 
which perpetuate and support existing structures. In either case, the elite is tradi-
tionally seen as some form of “establishment” that is controlled by the same group 
holding financial power. Yet according to Savage et al. (2015c), although the power 
of economic capital is vital, this “establishment” is not a helpful sociological concept 
because it implies greater closure and categorical separation from a wider wealthy 
sector of the population than their research has indicated. 
The authors contend that since the 1980s, increasing financialisation of the 
market, as well as public services, has boosted the number of higher-paid intermedi-
ary financial elites, and “apparently diminishe[d] the role of previously dominant 
managerial elites”. This “new” elite, embedded further and more subtly into society, 
has a different role to its predecessor, which was only, as suggested, interactive with 
the rest of society in its active or passive interactive roles, either as agents or instru-
ments of social change. Their “role is not the executive management of ‘men and 
things’ within corporate hierarchies but the switching or servicing of the flows of 
money through market trading and corporate deals whose profits greatly increase 
the numbers of working rich” (Savage e Williams, 2008, p. 10).
The structure and processes of this modern-day capitalism also function un-
der a different pace in relation to the new elites – “whereas giant firms were once 
long-lived survivors, they now typically have short lives, often involving changes of 
ownership” (Savage e Williams, 2008, p. 13). Increased membership coupled with 
the temporality of companies’ hold on power means those at the top are required 
to group, disperse, and regroup around capital, sometimes with opposing interests, 
at a pace which no longer requires homogeneity:
None of this requires a unitary elite, nor any kind of ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’, 
to reconcile sectionalism. […] Financial power thus works through the social and cultural 
imaginary with unpredictable and variable effects which often include disappointment about 
the gap between promise and outcome. (Savage e Williams, 2008, pp. 13-14)
Considering these elements, Savage et al. argue that we need to overcome the 
crystallized notion that elites are traditional “upper class” status groups repre-
senting reactionary survival and an opposition to the project of modernization. 
Drawing on Bourdieu, the contemporary field of power is “a scene of internal 
contestation and dispute between the most powerful and well-resourced agents 
from different sectors and professions, such as the financial, political, legal and 
journalistic elements” (Savage et al., 2015c, p. 309). The fractures, solidarities, 
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and links between those at the top, seen as dialectically cohesive and dispersed, 
now become relevant. 
In this sense, the contemporary elite class is very different to the idea of a tradi-
tional ‘upper class’ as well as ‘the establishment’: an “aristocratic, landed and gentle-
manly class which held sway in Britain until the later twentieth century” (Idem, p. 
303), evoking images of private schools and stately homes. Events across the 1970s 
and 1980s point to a decline of this reality, where the “de-industrialization of the 
old manufacturing heartlands” coupled with taxation of highest earners broke down 
the strong relations between this landed class and the establishment. The decline 
of this system was reflected in real-life contentions, such as Lady Diana Spencer’s 
embodiment of “a new ladylike aesthetic which positioned itself against the heart 
of the Establishment” (Idem, p. 305). Another manifestation of this shift can be 
witnessed in consumer culture: throughout the 1980s this image of landed gentry 
as a cultural motif acted as a goal for those intending to move up the social ladder, 
representing a “vulgarization of poshness” (Idem, p. 307). 
While an “establishment” is still held through those same cultural and social 
mechanisms today, it no longer necessarily stems from a class characterized by land 
and property ownership in the old heartlands of Great Britain. Here we once again 
understand the significance of deconstructing traditional images and looking into 
the finer details in order to relocate and characterize the aesthetic and systematic 
elements of elites today.
Elites in the uk: social mobility, education, location and the “right to speak”
Having introduced Savage et al.’s interest in new elites, it is useful to relate this idea 
to the findings of the gbcs (Savage et al., 2015b; 2015c). Certainly, the elite were 
not the sole interest of the project, but an understanding of their new appearance 
and interaction with capital, as those at the top, is vital to the main methodology 
of the research in question. In light of growing inequalities, and the failures of 
meritocracy and social mobility, it is necessary to understand the new class order 
of British society in a way that might facilitate new dealings with social problems. 
Recalling the heterogeneous nature of values which classify this new elite, Savage 
and his team understood that class cannot be measured solely by economic capital, 
but must also consider cultural and social capitals. Economic capital refers to ac-
cumulated wealth and income, while cultural capital focuses on tastes, interests and 
activities, and social capital considers relationships, networks and associations. These 
in mind, the gbcs pulled together a composite measure which could “illuminate the 
wider cultural and political significance of class” (Savage et al. 2015c, p. 4). At the 
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same time, it is important to note that this approach understands class in the sense 
of “class for itself ”, as a way of understanding how classes are formed, maintained, 
and passed on through generations.
Savage et al. (Idem) argue that the augmentation of economic capital leads to “a 
more complex and elaborate hierarchy of economic positions in the middle ranges 
of society”. While the top and bottom of the spectrum form coherent opposing 
images when it comes to the combination of income, savings and relationships to 
property, the middle sections appear more less clearly delineated. Here, occupa-
tion, for example, no longer associates with income quite so straight-forwardly, 
and accumulation as a long-term process plays a much more important role than 
previously understood.
The implications of this form of class analysis are considerable. Classes are not 
usefully seen as clearly bounded categorical groups, defined by some unitary crite-
ria (such as occupation). Classes exist – if they exist at all – as social formations, 
crystallising particular combinations of capitals. Following Bourdieu (1979; 2000), 
this rescues class analysis from the “scholastic point of view” and insists on class as 
only meaningful historically, and as actual social agents with the potential to drive 
social and political change.
Here we can note the shift in the analysis of the gbcs from the initial 2013 paper 
to that portrayed in the 2015 book. In the former paper, seven classes were defined 
using latent class analysis of measures of economic, social and cultural capital from 
the nationally representative GfK survey. However, this mode of presentation tended 
to reify these seven classes and led to considerable criticism (e.g. Mills, 2015). The 
2015 book adapted the subtly different emphasis that heuristically the gbcs analysis 
defined an elite at the top and a precariat at the bottom, but that the other classes 
in the middle ranges were rather more nebulous and their precise definition would 
be affected by measurement issues. This argument was analytically very important: 
rather than fixating on the relationship between the middle and working classes 
which has been the staple focus of class analysis, here it is the boundaries at the top 
levels of the class structure which are crucial.
In light of this work, the uk elite have been repainted. Precisely because there 
was a sample skew in the gbcs by geographical region (towards London and the 
South East), income (towards the wealthy), occupation (towards professionals and 
managers) and level of education (towards those with university qualifications), this 
led to a proportionately exaggerated amount of data on “those at the top”, a very 
unusual outcome in the British context. This fact has been used to an advantage, 
building an in-depth picture of the elite and the new evidence of mechanisms which 
keep them at such a position. 
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One of Savage’s main analytical points, (partly following Piketty, 2013) is that 
it is necessary to move away from a focus on the super-rich, or the top 1% “super-
wealthy” to include a rather larger portion of British society (the elite were defined 
as 6% of the population in Savage et al., 2013). Occupationally they are characterized 
in frequency in descending order: chief executive officers (a large majority); it and 
telecommunications directors; marketing and sales directors; functional managers 
and directors; barristers and judges; financial managers; dental practitioners; ad-
vertising and public relations directors. These occupations are associated with levels 
of economic capital which set them well apart from any other social group, with 
household income (after tax and other deductions) around £89k, almost double 
that of the next highest class, and an average house price of £325k, by far the highest 
compared to any other class. In addition, their average savings are particularly high, 
well over double that of any other class. 
In more specific terms, they can be categorized as follows:
The elite have close to the highest number of social contacts, though partly for this reason 
their mean status score is not the highest of all the classes, but the second highest (since if 
one knows a large number of people, this makes it more likely for them to know both high 
and low status people). They also score the highest on “highbrow” cultural capital, though 
by a less marked margin than for their economic capital, and they have moderately high 
scores on emerging cultural capital – so it would be unwise to just see them as highbrow. […] 
They have the lowest proportion of ethnic minorities, the highest proportion of graduates, 
and over half come from families where the main earner was in senior management or the 
professions. They are clearly a relatively exclusive grouping, with restricted upward mobility 
into its ranks. […] Graduates of elite universities are over-represented amongst their ranks, 
especially from Oxford, City, Kings College London, lse, Cambridge, Bristol, London South 
Bank, Imperial College and Trinity College Dublin. Strikingly, six of these universities are 
located in London, only Trinity is from outside the south of England. Geographically, their 
residences are all over-represented in the south east of England, and especially in areas close 
to London in the affluent Home Counties (Savage et al., 2013, pp. 233-234).
A number of further aspects deserve closer observation, such as those linked to 
social mobility, education, location and political participation. Using the analogy 
of climbing a steep mountain, Savage et al. (2015c, pp. 188-189) demonstrate the 
huge economic differences between those at the top and bottom. With inequalities 
well above what they were for previous generations, these mountains “now rise[ing] 
much further above the valley than they did three decades ago” (Idem, p. 188). The 
skills required to climb these mountains – that is, to get ahead of others – appear 
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to be based on “fitness, talent, determination and endeavour” (Idem, p. 188), but 
also require the mobilisation of capitals by parents and individuals.
In this light, and despite the hope and belief in the possibility of upward mobil-
ity, the gbcs data has revealed that the higher class you are, to follow the metaphor, 
the higher up the mountain you were to begin with. For example, “51% of those in 
our elite class had parents who were in class 1 (senior managerial and professional) 
compared to only 11% who had parents who were in the precariat” (Idem, p. 193). 
What further data shows is that while it is possible to move up, it is extremely likely 
you will remain in an economic, social or cultural camp similar to that of your par-
ents, and though rising is hard, falling is less likely.
While many of these results may seem to prove what many sociologists have long 
argued regarding the problematic of social mobility, this unique insight on cultural 
and social capital reveals a further layer of complexity to the argument. Evidence 
points to a link between the type of profession and the likelihood of entry for indi-
viduals of a different background. If technical emerging professions are accepting of 
the upwardly mobile, the more traditional professions in law, business and medicine 
rely on “the more opaque and hard-to-acquire resources of cultural and social capital 
that the privileged tend to inherit from their parents” (Idem, p. 197).
Considering the cultural confidence and perceived political power held most 
highly by those of elite status, it holds that the three capitals are interdependent in 
maintaining these particular types of professions in similar hands. Further to this, 
the gbcs revealed that even when upward mobility occurs, there exists a very real 
“social class background pay gap”, in which the salary for the same career and position 
vary according to the employee’s background. For example, the ceos, directors and 
presidents whose parents were either senior managers or in the traditional profes-
sions currently earn a salary of around £100k per year, while those whose parents 
were manual labourers or never worked have an average wage of around £83k. In 
addition, they will continue to have accumulated less cultural and social capital 
than those from more advantaged backgrounds (Idem, p. 216; see also Laurison e 
Friedman, 2016). 
The exclusivity of the elite continues to hold true when it comes to education. 
The results of the gbcs drew fascinating lines between particular institutions and 
high levels of capitals, showing that, today, entry to the elite is disproportionately 
linked to specific universities. This research showed that it is not whether you go to 
university or not, but which university that matters more. While we have come a 
long way in terms of opening university doors to people of all kinds of backgrounds 
(the figure currently standing at about half of all under thirty-year-olds in Great 
Britain), “expansion has not, unfortunately, led to greater equality among young 
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people” (Savage et al., 2015c, p. 224). Firstly, this is because the number of “disad-
vantaged” attending university has grown, but so also have the numbers for those 
already in the elite, thus when we look at the gap between the two, the evidence of 
improvement is marginal. The overall effect of increasing university attendance has 
actually seen a “tightening association between graduate status and membership of 
the most advantaged groups in British society” (Idem, p. 229).
There are currently over 150 universities in the uk, with considerable variations 
in status, determined largely by the age, size, character of the faculties and social 
recruitment of students. The older universities, such as Oxford and Cambridge, are 
based on a system of colleges, with many traditional features and famed reputations 
for their research, who generally receive students from the most favoured classes (the 
elite and established middle class). At the same time, the system floodgates other 
institutions, classified by Savage et al. (Idem, p. 233) as follows: redbrick universi-
ties, such as Birmingham, Manchester and Sheffield; plateglass universities, such as 
Sussex, Warwick and York, and; newer, post-1992 institutions, converted en masse 
to university status this year, which tend to have more varied social groups in their 
student body.
While elite status association with top universities in Great Britain is no surprise, 
the particular data of the gbcs provided new further layers of detail. Proving more 
concentrated than previously expected, the elitist circles of exclusivity within univer-
sities is manifest. The elite exceptionality is tighter packed within a smaller number 
of universities than in the traditionally classed “Oxbridge” (Oxford and Cambridge 
universities) and “Russell Group” members (a cluster of the best 24 universities in the 
uk) (see Wakeling e Savage, 2015). The hierarchy between students from different 
universities is very visible. Even within the same city of Bristol, for example, with its 
University of Bristol (widely considered “for Oxbridge rejects” and more middle-
class or “posh”), and the University of the West of England (seen as more working 
class) the “students associate the two different universities with young people from 
different social classes who are distinguished by different behaviour, clothes, and so 
on – what Bourdieu would label as different ‘habitus’” (Savage et al., 2015c, p. 237). 
Here we reach another distinguishing feature within the gbcs’s view of class: 
location. Rather than separating the social and spatial, Savage emphasises how these 
are inter-related: classes form in specific locations which are central to their being. A 
form of hierarchical geography favouring particular capital accumulations ran across 
a number of dimensions, mostly urban-rural, north-south, and the metropolitan 
capital of London versus Greater London. Location is also shown to correspond 
with other pockets of economic, cultural and social capital, such as house prices, 
school quality and job opportunities, making accumulation an even easier task for 
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those who are already higher up the “mountain”. Additionally, new spatial factors 
also help us to understand the changing shape of the elite and new structures of 
capital: “The old aristocratic class with roots in the land, at the apex of the class 
structure, has given way to a more fundamentally urbanized class” (Idem, p. 297).
London, a historically rich centre in terms of all forms of capital, is the home 
for most of the elite as defined by the gbcs’s categorization. Arguing against the 
stance that London is characterized by transnational “placeless” elites, the survey 
demonstrates “distinctive forms of elite territoriality at work” both in the centre 
of London and the South East of England. This is seen through higher levels of 
household income, property value, household savings, concentration of higher-status 
social networks, both highbrow and emerging cultural capital, and opportunities 
for higher-paid employment (see Cunningham e Savage, 2015, pp. 334-337 for a 
visual presentation of these distributions).
Using a further unit of analysis on the elite only, the Local Indicator of Spatial 
Association allows us to understand how the elite is spread across a given space. 
Applying a local regression methodology (Anselin, 1995; O’Sullivan e Unwin, 
2003), Cunningham and Savage (2015) consider capitals surrounding a given area 
in relation to it, giving measures of high elite areas close to other elite areas, low 
elite areas close to other low elite areas, but also high elite areas close to low elite 
locations, and the inverse. Having utilized this, it becomes obvious that the London 
and South East elite form “distinctive patterns of cultural engagement”. Not only do 
they find that all forms of capital are most highly clustered in these areas, but that 
they correspond with occupation, painting a picture of an even more concentrated 
presence of business, cultural and legal elites all centred around London. The most 
advantaged is perhaps the London business elite because of the “economic power 
within this group is exclusively clustered in the south-east of England, where property 
values in addition to higher average income levels act to mark out a sub-group of 
elevated financial advantage” (Cunningham e Savage, 2015, p. 341). 
This contrasts with the elite in areas such as Lancashire (North West England) 
and North Wales, where high income is generally coupled with low property value. 
Thus, London is a distinctive place where high levels of capital correlate and re-
produce each other, further breeding and accentuating the advantages of this elite.
The final aspect of exclusive privilege to be discussed is that of political par-
ticipation or political confidence. Earlier, this rather abstract form of privilege, 
confidence, was mentioned in the context of cultural capital, where one of the main 
markers in elite or higher class cultural capital was a sense of confidence and ability 
to manoeuvre through a wide range of topics pertaining to the “emerging” cultural 
capital, coupled with a negative judgement of those who could not. Additionally, 
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the elite are notably more aware of this form of privilege they have over others. As 
pointed out by surveys, the elite are the most likely to see themselves as being “at 
the top” and “have a distinctive sense of their own privileged class identity” (Savage 
et al., 2015c, p. 371). This in mind, it is worth considering aspects of politicization 
and power as further characteristics of the elite. Returning to Bourdieu’s notion of a 
“right to speak”, Laurison (2015, p. 351) has used the rich data of the gbcs to better 
understand these aspects. In his view, the well off and well educated demonstrate 
greater participation in politics and also have at their disposal the economic capital 
to perform “other forms of persuasion” (Idem, p. 349) which in general correlate 
with “dominant or elite culture, practices and positions” (Idem, p. 351).
Creating a dialogue between gbcs/GfK data on the elite and research carried 
out by Clark and Acock (1989), Laurison examines responses to two main ques-
tions: “Can I influence British decisions?” and “Would I contact a uk government 
official or Member of Parliament?” Next, he experiments with variables of educa-
tion, income, occupation and age to better understand the main factors in play. The 
picture of those elite with the greatest “right to speak” is clear: political participation 
is more likely if you are a university graduate earning over £200k. Additionally, there 
is a positive correlation between a sense of “the right to speak” and age, up until the 
age of 66 when this begins to decline (Laurison, 2015, p. 357). Furthermore, he 
notes differences in the finer details that demonstrate a trajectory, where attending 
a fee paying secondary school and later attending Oxbridge puts you in the best 
‘position’ sociopolitically. This may suggest that paying for schooling is enough to 
give your children the political confidence they need to do well in life, yet further 
data demonstrates how this trajectory even begins well before schooling takes 
place: even if you are now in the elite, your parents’ origins matter when it comes 
to political engagement: “Growing up in a family with a main earner in a higher-
status occupation (and thus likely with a high income and greater educational and 
cultural capital) is positively associated with greater political engagement among 
gbcs respondents” (Idem, p. 361).
Thinking elites: limits and possibilities
The construction of classes as expressed in the work of Savage and his colleagues 
required that the data had to be approached both epistemologically as well as empiri-
cally. Previous ways of conceiving class had to be rethought so that class analysis is 
fit for the analytical challenges of the 21st century. Work of such a nature involves 
academic polemics in itself, as well as arising amongst a long tradition of debates on 
class. Generally, the critics which have addressed work stemming from the gbcs can 
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be categorized in these two ways. First, there are critics who dispute the idea that 
classes are not only determined economically, a notion empirically rooted in the 
strong tradition of basing surveys on income and professional categorization; and 
second, how to measure and deploy types of capital which tend to be understood as 
non-determinant amongst social differences, those relating to culture and social ties.
An attempt to substantiate these elements has led to multiple debates, such as 
Collin Mills’ (2015) critique of the collection and use of data, May’s disappointment 
in its descriptive nature which fell short of the practicality and ‘human betterment’ 
(May, 2015) hoped for by readers, or Skeggs’ (2015) disagreement with the survey’s 
terminology of choice. However, for the purposes of this article, which focuses on 
the topic of the elite, we distance ourselves from the extensive debate on methodol-
ogy and refer interested readers to the now considerable literature so they can make 
up their own minds.
Next, we turn to the critiques which found fault in Savage’s definition of class8. 
In the main, this was picked up by Marxist based understandings of class relations. 
For Alberto Toscano and Jamie Woodcock, an understanding of the elite based on 
its relation to other classes, i.e, through exploitation, cannot be ignored. They argue 
that capital accumulation could be used to explain financialisation such as via the 
housing market (Toscano e Woodcock, 2015, p. 518), but would also render the 
survey conscious and applicable to more global structures. For Beverley Skeggs, 
on the other hand, the problem lies in a confused conflation of the terms “class” 
and “stratification”: “The gbcs claims to be a relational analysis but it is more a 
gradational mapping of status, as Harriet Bradley (2014) notes” (Skeggs, 2015, p. 
212). For her, it is the additional element of legitimating symbolic power that allows 
gradual stratifications to be understood as class. In other words, recognizing and 
self-identifying with the “symbolic mechanisms that uphold class power” (Idem, 
p. 213) such as exploitation, domination, dispossession and devaluation is vital to 
understanding class. Yet, Savage himself stated that: “the fundamental argument of 
the cars [capitals, assets, and resources] perspective is that class is not to be conflated 
with the division of labour, or with concepts such as exploitation, which also become 
loaded and moralistic” (Savage et al., 2015c, p. 47). The problem raised by these 
criticisms is that they appear to return class analysis to a theoretical discussion of 
first principles (is class seen “relationally”, how is class related to “exploitation” etc.), 
rather than used for actual analysis of real world situations. Here, it is incumbent on 
critics of the gbcs to show that their perspectives make sense of the current political 
situation better. This is not a step which has been taken so far. 
8. See also Latimer e Munro (2015) and Tyler (2015) for further discussions on class.
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The applicability to the gbcs for contexts other than the uk is another source 
of criticism. For Tai-Lok Lui (2015), for example, structural differences in China, 
where institutions often play a vital role in class formation and reproduction means 
that consumption as seen by Savage would not be so appropriate. Savage’s work 
therefore lacked the transferable quality which would give it extra credit, a fact 
which is addressed in the book itself:
We do not claim that the British experience is typical or that it lays down a course which 
other nations will follow. Far from it. However, we do think that the issues discussed here 
are unlikely to be confined to this country alone and will have resonances around the planet, 
even while we fully acknowledge that as one of the wealthier nations in the world, the re-
lationship between wealth elites and poorer classes will be very different in other countries 
(Savage et al., 2015c, p. 18).
The gbcs is not a template to be applied to different nations, but an encourage-
ment to reflect on how economic, social and cultural capital may crystallise in vari-
ous contexts. This having been said, taking elites seriously is something which may 
have wide resonance across the globe given economic trends towards the growing 
fortunes of the wealthy. Taking Savage’s advice, we consider the possibilities of such 
a project in the case of Brazil, where this article is being produced and where finding 
and measuring the key factors in perpetuating massive inequality might benefit from 
considering the approach and scale of the gbcs. While it goes without saying that 
the self-labelled experiment cannot be transferred without first working on meth-
odological adjustments and a consideration of Brazil’s unique capital structures, the 
particular combination of data and the scale of the project could offer new insights. 
Firstly, we have seen how the data has highlighted the importance of cultural and 
social capital in determining divisions and maintaining class boundaries, especially 
across time. Secondly, the data collected has allowed for an extremely in-depth view 
of where other more particular forms of inequality are present, namely when look-
ing at education and location, and therefore where they can begin to be dealt with. 
Location and education are of particular interest in the Brazilian context, of which 
we are informed via an abundance of research on inequality which considers variables 
of economic and cultural capital. This includes studies on territorial occupation in 
the big cities as a class inflection, as well as the perverse situation of the schooling 
process, which sees heightened disparities related to institutional quality, access 
and permanence of privileged social groups, and exclusion of less favoured classes. 
In this light, the applicability of the gbcs to elites in a country like Brazil can 
be measured much more by the inquiries that the study itself has been provoking 
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in terms of similarities and differences. If, on the one hand, questions of current 
inequality can bring two contexts together, the historical mechanisms of produc-
tion of these disparities assume irreducible particularities. But if we think of the 
inequalities from the configuration of the new financial capitalism and the political 
changes brought about by neoliberalism, would we have confluences in the forma-
tion of the “new elites”? Is there a new rearrangement of transnational classes that 
could be more visible in countries like Brazil, not only in relation to those belonging 
to the universe of the richest 1%? 
The framework of British society demonstrated in the work of Savage presents 
specific cleavages, but the methodological elements which seek to define the struc-
ture of distribution for different types of capital is an important contribution to 
elite studies in the country. In this light, what is the dividing structure of classes 
stemming from the three types of capital (economic, cultural and social)? What are 
the characteristics of the cars (capitals, assets, and resources) that mobilize for the 
elite and in which spaces do they guarantee them power? Would the Brazilian elite 
also be fractioned from a more traditional nucleus, composed of an urban-industrial 
aristocracy as well as a landed gentry, and a further urban-financial group concretized 
by financial intermediaries? Where do we situate the professional-liberals and the 
body of high state bureaucracy, marked by retaining distinctive types of capital in 
the country?
In sum, the gbcs’s research on the elite is an important means to think about 
investigating other social structures that are strongly polarized by the unequal distri-
bution of various types of capital. Absorbing the wealth of material made available by 
the gbcs in the logic of the British society in question has already posed a challenge 
to sociological research, but linking this analysis to other empirical contexts is what 
would enable, perhaps, valued feedback to this endeavour. 
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Abstract
Elites in the uk: new approaches to contemporary class divisions
The aim of this article is to demonstrate the “new” elites emerging in the uk amidst the economic, 
political and social context of neoliberalism. To do this, we examine the works of Mike Savage 
regarding what elite studies have meant for contemporary forms of social division. Using data 
from the Great British Class Survey, the author underlines sociological elements that are central 
to the composition of this financialised elite. We describe cleavages in terms of social mobility, 
education, location and politicization that are generated through the concentration of distinct 
types of capital (economic, social and cultural). Departing from the specific context of Great 
Britain, we intend to contribute to the development of a sociology of elites, through a discus-
sion of both new perspectives and the limits and possibilities of treating different geographic, 
political and social contexts.
Keywords: New elites; Elites in the uk; Financialised elite; Elites and social divisions.
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Resumo
Elites no Reino Unido: novas abordagens para divisões de classe contemporâneas
O objetivo do artigo é demonstrar as “novas” elites que emergem no Reino Unido no contexto 
econômico, político e social do neoliberalismo. Para tal, utilizam-se os amplos trabalhos de Mike 
Savage acerca do significado do estudo de elites para as formas contemporâneas das divisões sociais. 
Os dados do Great British Class Survey servem de base para este autor delinear os elementos 
sociológicos centrais da composição destas elites da financeirização. Descrevem-se as clivagens 
em termos de mobilidade social, educação, localização e politização geradas pela concentração 
de distintos tipos de capital (econômico, social e cultural). A partir da especificidade britânica, 
pretende-se contribuir para o desenvolvimento da sociologia das elites tanto na discussão de 
novas perspectivas quanto nos limites e possibilidades da abordagem em diferentes contextos 
geográficos, políticos e sociais. 
Palavras-chave: Novas elites; Elites no Reino Unido; Elites da financeirização; Elites e divisões 
sociais.
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